California supports policies which protect injured parties from civil wrongdoers who attempt to thwart liability by depending on collateral source payments made to the plaintiff. Allowing defendants who have not contributed to the obtainment of insurance to avoid responsibility for the damage/injury they cause violates the collateral source rule. The fact that the plaintiff had the prudence to purchase insurance does not negate the defendant’s obligation to provide compensation for the injury he caused. The Collateral Source Rule developed at common law to prevent tortfeasors (civil wrongdoers) from receiving a “windfall from the thrift and foresight of persons who have . . . secured insurance . . . to provide for themselves and their families.” McKinney v. California Portland Cement Co., 96 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1222 (2002); Arambula v. Wells, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1009 (1999) “Under the collateral source rule, plaintiffs in personal injury actions can still recover full damages even though they already have received compensation for their injuries from such ‘collateral sources’ as medical insurance.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 4th 174, 176 (1994). Even if the plaintiff is fully compensated for injuries/loss, he is still protected by the collateral source rule and deserves full restitution for the damages caused by the wrongdoer. The collateral resource rule is a judgment that not only encourages citizens to purchase insurance and protect themselves, but also to prevent civil wrongdoers from escaping liability for damages they cause. A judgment that contradicts the collateral resource rule confuses the legal responsibility of the person at fault for the losses.McKinney, supra, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 1222, Arambula, supra, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 1009; Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad, 31 Cal. 4th 1, 8 (2003) (recognized the collateral source rule as “generally accepted,” citing Helfend, supra, 2 Cal. 3d at 6, and Rest. 2d Torts, 920, 920A).

In one court case, the Collateral Source Rule was supported, highlighting that the plaintiff was entitled to full compensation for damages, including the amount forgiven by the hospital. “There is no evidence of record showing that

[defendant] had anything to do with procuring the discount of [plaintiff’s] bill by [the hospital]. The rationale of the rule favors her, just as it would had she been compensated by insurance for which she had arranged.” Montgomery Wardsupra, 334 Ark. at 565;Arambula, supra, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 1012; see also Acuar v. Letoutneau, 531 S.E. 2d 316, 322-23 (Va. Supreme Court, 2000).